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REGULATING SCIENCE FICTION: THE REGULATORY
DEFICIENCIES IN A RAPIDLY GROWING COMMERCIAL
SPACE INDUSTRY
H. AUSTIN SIMPSON*

ABSTRACT
This Comment explores the deficiencies of the legal framework governing commercial space with the advent of satellite
mega-constellations. The scope and size of these so-called constellations are completely unlike anything the space industry has
contemplated since the first rocket was launched into orbit.
Moreover, these constellations are an extremely new phenomenon—the prime movers in the industry are just beginning to
create these massive man-made wonders in space. As such, the
legal framework was designed around space operations that
were much smaller in scope. That framework has struggled to
keep pace with the rapidly growing commercial space industry
generally and the constellation industry specifically.
This Comment begins by explaining some of the pressing
concerns regarding space exploration roused by the addition of
tens of thousands of small satellites primarily within Earth’s
lower orbit. It then lays out the relevant regulatory framework. It
discusses how that framework has operated in the past, how it
has been applied to commercial satellite constellations so far,
and how it has changed over the past few years. Finally, this
Comment discusses the reality of satellite constellation regulation—that it is being largely self-regulated by the industry. It
analyzes the benefits and negative aspects of that reality, and it
concludes with a proposal on how to move forward with space
regulation such that the continued viability of space exploration
and the protection of relevant stakeholders will be assured well
into the future.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25172/jalc.87.4.4
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2023; B.A. English, Colorado
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INTRODUCTION

S

INCE THE FIRST SATELLITE launch in 1957, there have
only been a total of about 13,630 satellites launched into
space, a significant number of which can be attributed to recent
launches by SpaceX and others.1 As of May 2022, 5,465 of those
satellites are currently operating in space.2 SpaceX, the private
space-exploration company leading the charge, plans to send
over 40,000 satellites into space on its own as a part of its Starlink project, the ultimate purpose of which is to provide global
high-speed internet.3 SpaceX claims that it is “meeting or exceeding all regulatory and industry standards.”4 Indeed, that
claim is very likely true. However, are projects that greatly exceed the total number of satellites ever launched within the
scope of those regulations and industry standards? Moreover,
will those regulations and standards be sufficient to protect all
1 Compare Adam Mann, Tereza Pultarova & Elizabeth Howell, SpaceX Starlink
Internet: Costs, Collision Risks and How It Works, SPACE.COM (Apr. 14, 2022), https:/
/www.space.com/spacex-starlink-satellites.html [https://perma.cc/9AM24D8M], with Space Debris by the Numbers, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Aug. 11, 2022),
https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/
Space_debris_by_the_numbers [https://perma.cc/9AM2-4D8M] [hereinafter
Space Debris by the Numbers].
2 UCS Satellite Database, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org
/resources/satellite-database [https://perma.cc/7GZ6-4NBV] (May 1, 2022).
3 Mann et al., supra note 1.
4 World’s
Most Advanced Broadband Satellite Internet, STARLINK, https://
www.starlink.com/satellites [https://perma.cc/8MCH-YST6].
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stakeholders’ interests5 in light of these massive projects? Obviously, key players such as SpaceX will protect their own interests
to the best of their abilities, but the coordination of tens of
thousands of satellites launched by other entities poses a monumental challenge that extends beyond the efforts of a few key
players. The margin of error is slim, and the risks are extreme.6
A satellite mega-constellation is a group of satellites—potentially numbering in the thousands—that communicate with
each other and receivers on Earth, with an aim to provide worldwide services.7 Many of those satellites will operate in low Earth
orbit (LEO), and there is significant concern over the amount
of “real estate” these man-made constellations will occupy in
LEO due to the risk of potential collisions.8 Further, there is
growing concern that the current regulatory structure has allowed private companies with significant resources such as
SpaceX and Blue Origin to begin capitalizing on the low regulatory bar by launching massive amounts of satellites before the
regulatory regime can slow them down.9 Skirting environmental
review during licensing, for example, is something that may
change before long.10 Indeed, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) is being sued by two SpaceX competitors for
authorizing SpaceX’s launch of thousands of small satellites into
5 “Stakeholders” in this context means anyone affected by the consequences of
space operations. At its narrowest, the term refers to astronomers as a class—i.e.,
people whose jobs, livelihoods, or industries are directly affected by space operations. At its broadest, the term refers to almost everyone on the planet in that
there is a shared interest in the continued innovation and expansion of space
operations. See, e.g., Stakeholder, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stakeholder [https://perma.cc/MT6H-NAMY] (defining
“stakeholder” in the abstract as “one that has a stake in an enterprise” or “one
who is involved in or affected by a course of action”).
6 See Mann et al., supra note 1 (reporting that in 2019, the probability of collision was 1 in 1,000, but in August 2021, “Starlink satellites were involved every
week in about 1,600 encounters between two spacecraft closer than 0.6 miles”).
7 Tanishka Goswami & Shikhar Aggarwal, SpaceX, OneWeb and the ‘Mega’ Effect of
Mega-Constellations on International Space Law, JURIST (May 31, 2021, 2:15 AM),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2021/05/goswami-aggarwal-internationalspace-law/ [https://perma.cc/9UFV-3FP5].
8 Id.; Christopher D. Johnson, The Legal Status of MegaLEO Constellations and
Concerns About Appropriation of Large Swaths of Earth Orbit, in HANDBOOK OF SMALL
SATELLITES 1, 2–3 (J. Pelton ed., 2020).
9 Peggy Hollinger & Clive Cookson, Elon Musk Being Allowed to ‘Make the Rules’
in Space, ESA Chief Warns, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/7d561078-37c7-4902-a094-637b81a26241 [https://perma.cc/6ZXN-ULFZ].
10 Ramon J. Ryan, The Fault in Our Stars: Challenging the FCC’s Treatment of Commercial Satellites as Categorically Excluded from Review Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 923, 924–27 (2020).
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LEO without an environmental review.11 Absent a judicial stay
on SpaceX launches, however, SpaceX will continue to launch
satellites in batches of several dozen at a time.12
Commentators have raised various specific issues regarding
the controversy surrounding mega-constellations. While some
predicted the FCC would be brought into litigation over megaconstellations and have offered suggestions on how private companies should navigate the legal framework to avoid litigation,13
others have adamantly argued that legislation like the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has no application to activities solely within the province and jurisdiction of space.14 While
these commentaries offer insightful analysis of the current regulatory framework—just as current litigation against the FCC is
testing that framework—an important question remains unanswered: Why is there not a more satisfactory regulatory framework through which these issues can be resolved?
The FCC has been, for all intents and purposes,
grandfathered into its regulatory power over satellites from a
general authorization to regulate radio use.15 The notion that
Congress intended for the FCC to regulate the launch of tens of
thousands of satellites while enjoying its categorical exemption
from NEPA review seems questionable at best. Further, to say
that NEPA is the best way to protect environmental and other
legitimate interests on Earth is telling as to the utter inadequacy
of space regulation in its current form. Critics have a legitimate
argument that NEPA should not extend to activities in space.16
However, the suggestion that nothing should regulate space activity or the effects that such activity may have on Earth in the abKhorri Atkinson, FCC Ripped at DC Circ. over SpaceX’s Satellite Launch, LAW360
(Aug. 9, 2021, 7:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1410921/fcc-rippedat-dc-circ-over-spacex-s-satellite-launch- [https://perma.cc/Y96D-3KC5]; see generally Final Brief of Appellants Viasat, Inc. and the Balance Group. at 1–2, Viasat,
Inc. v. FCC, Nos. 21-1123, -1125, -1128 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 26, 2021).
12 Atkinson, supra note 11; Amy Thompson, SpaceX Lofts 49 Starlink Internet
Satellites to Orbit in 1st Launch of 2022, SPACE.COM (Jan. 6, 2022), https://
www.space.com/spacex-starlink-launch-success-january-2022 [https://perma.cc/
2548-EFXM].
13 Ryan, supra note 10, at 949–50.
14 MICHAEL J. ELLIS, THE HERITAGE FOUND., KEEP ENVIRONMENTAL RED TAPE
OUT OF OUTER SPACE, 1, 1 (2021), https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/keep-environmental-red-tape-out-outer-space [https://perma.cc/
H8L8-G3KG].
15 DANIEL MORGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45416, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL
REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND UTILIZATION 11–12 (2018).
16 ELLIS, supra note 14, at 3–5.
11
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sence of NEPA is a wholly untenable position. So, why is there
nothing better to turn to?
Frankly, the current regulatory framework was not prepared
for the new and intense commercial interest in mega-constellations. Rather than tightening its regulatory grip on the industry
to ensure space enterprises are proceeding safely and intelligently, the government has opted to let the industry regulate
itself—an admittedly common administrative stance.17 But can
self-regulation be left unfettered in the fragile context of space
exploration? This Comment proposes that the current litigation
between the FCC, Viasat, and others18—regardless of the outcome—highlights the dysfunctionality and inadequacy of current space regulation. The fate of space exploration should not
be left to a haphazard jumble of outdated, incoherent regulatory constraints while the industry forges ahead at breakneck
pace to secure its place in the stars, potentially dooming the industry in the process. Efforts must be made immediately and
tactfully to guide commercial space enterprises in their pursuit
to make science fiction a reality.
This Comment will first walk through the basics: Part II will
discuss mega-constellations, the concerns surrounding those
constellations, and the enterprises and entities that are sending
or planning to send small satellites into orbit. Part III will then
walk through the international and domestic frameworks, including recent changes to those frameworks. Part IV will analyze
what could be expected from those frameworks based on analogous settings. It will weigh the pros and cons of the current
frameworks in the unique context of satellite constellations. It
will also offer potential modifications to tailor the frameworks
towards growing needs and concerns.
II.

MEGA-CONSTELLATIONS, CONCERNS, AND KEY
PLAYERS EXPLAINED
A.

SATELLITE MEGA-CONSTELLATIONS19

Satellite mega-constellations are vast systems of satellites that
use hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands of similar
satellites that aim to provide global internet access, among other
See infra Parts III–IV.
For a refresher on this litigation, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19 The terms “satellite mega-constellation(s),” “satellite constellation(s),” or
simply “constellation(s)” are used interchangeably throughout this Comment
except where stated otherwise.
17
18
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things.20 Rather than using larger satellites at higher, fixed positions (i.e., geostationary orbit)—the traditional method of satellite internet service—these satellite constellations orbit Earth at
a much lower altitude (i.e., non-geostationary orbit) and are
much closer together.21 Since these satellites are much closer to
Earth, they do not have the same latency issues as their larger,
farther away predecessors, which makes them an attractive
choice for internet provision.22 Since so many satellites make up
a constellation, a net of seamless connectivity is possible between the satellite system and receivers that can be placed virtually anywhere on the planet and still connect to the web of
satellites above.23 Satellite internet generally allows for easier access in rural and underserved areas of the globe because there is
no need to physically lay down cable connections for those areas
to receive internet.24
Thus, through satellite mega-constellations like Starlink,
“[p]eople across the globe [can] . . . gain access to education,
health services and even communications support during natural disasters.”25 Indeed, in a powerful display of Starlink’s capabilities, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk reported that Starlink internet
services were available within just a few hours of the Ukrainian
Deputy Prime Minister’s plea for internet to help combat Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.26 Thus, it is easy to see the benefits
these satellite systems can provide, and they could be a huge
step in the advancement of telecommunications. There are,
however, some concerns that have been raised by astronomers
and other scientists based on the sheer number of planned satellites at such a low orbit.

20 See What Is a Satellite Constellation?, SODAH, https://www.sodahconstellation.
eu/what-is-a-satellite-constellation/ [https://perma.cc/2E8J-RZNH]; Satellite Constellations, INT’L ASTRONOMICAL UNION (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.iau.org/public/themes/satellite-constellations/ [https://perma.cc/Q6ZM-J7VL].
21 See SODAH, supra note 20.
22 See id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Order Starlink, STARLINK, https://www.starlink.com/ [https://perma.cc/
UA82-R4ZZ].
26 See Natalia Kniazhevich, Elon Musk Activates Starlink Satellites in Response to
Ukraine Plea, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2022, 6:28 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2022-02-27/musk-activates-starlink-satellites-in-response-toukraine-plea [https://perma.cc/H57Q-93YX].

2022]

REGULATING SCIENCE FICTION
B.

765

MEGA-CONSTELLATIONS CONCERNS

There are several concerns over mega-constellations that impact both celestial and earthbound interests. Importantly, these
concerns are not merely academic, nor do they only affect a
small group of stakeholders. Indeed, the private and public entities that could benefit the most from these systems of satellites
also have the most to lose should something go wrong. This Section first explores potential environmental impacts such as pollution and ozone threats, then discusses the dangers posed by
space debris, and finally analyzes recent research that shows how
all of those concerns could be interrelated.
To start, a recent article published in the Vanderbilt Journal of
Entertainment & Technology Law brought into focus the FCC’s categorical exemption from NEPA and how a court would likely
strike down that exemption should the FCC apply it to the authorization of satellite mega-constellations.27 The article’s author, Ramon Ryan, argued that the cumulative effects that
massive satellite systems could have on the environment should
impose an obligation upon the FCC to conduct an environmental review as a part of the authorization process.28
Prompted by the article,29 SpaceX competitors Viasat and
Dish Network filed suit against the FCC claiming that it violated
NEPA by not conducting an environmental review prior to authorizing SpaceX’s request to lower the orbit of thousands of
satellites that form its ongoing project, Starlink.30 Viasat argued
that SpaceX’s satellite system warrants a detailed environmental
review because (1) the satellites will dump massive amounts of
pollutants upon re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere, and (2) the
satellites will be so numerous that the light pollution caused by
the sun reflecting off of them will significantly alter the night
sky.31
Some have posited that Viasat’s argument should fail because
“[w]ithout any relevant conduct inside of the United States,
NEPA would not extend into outer space.”32 In other words,
NEPA’s jurisdiction is limited to conduct that takes place in the
United States and simply does not extend to space.33 While this
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

See Ryan, supra note 10, at 924–27.
Id.
See ELLIS, supra note 14, at 7.
See Atkinson, supra note 11.
Id.
ELLIS, supra note 14, at 4.
See id.
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argument may be a good legal argument to make against Viasat
and others who bring suit, the underlying concerns are still legitimate—satellite constellations dump pollutants into the atmosphere and interfere with people’s ability to stargaze and
research the night sky.34
NEPA may offer even less recourse for astronomers regarding
the added light pollution from satellite constellations.35 Astronomers’ ability to study the night sky has been significantly altered by the addition of thousands of reflective aluminum
objects in orbit.36 Legal experts have said that those astronomers
have little to no legal mechanisms at their disposal to prevent or
alter satellite constellations,37 and the Viasat litigation is testing
that conclusion in federal court.38 Despite initially dismissing
the concern about light pollution,39 industry leaders such as
SpaceX are addressing the matter and trying to make satellites
less reflective.40 But the mere fact that this incident happened is
concerning. It seems obvious in retrospect that thousands of reflective metal objects could have a significant impact on astronomy, but that consequence was either overlooked or ignored.41
These arguments and counterarguments over the environmental impact of mega-constellations highlight a couple of im34 Shannon Hall, After SpaceX Starlink Launch, a Fear of Satellites That Outnumber
All Visible Stars, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/
01/science/starlink-spacex-astronomers.html [https://perma.cc/L78G-CACV];
Tereza Pultarova, Challenge for Astronomy: Megaconstellations Becoming the New Light
Pollution, SPACE.COM (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.space.com/megaconstellations-disruption-astronomy-like-light-pollution [https://perma.cc/NCR6-Z5DY].
35 See Jeff Foust, Little Legal Recourse for Astronomers Concerned About Starlink,
SPACENEWS (June 3, 2019), https://spacenews.com/little-legal-recourse-for-astronomers-concerned-about-starlink/ [https://perma.cc/G8NJ-CGSQ].
36 See id.
37 See, e.g., id.
38 See Atkinson, supra note 11.
39 Jonathan O’Callaghan, Elon Musk: Starlink Will Cause ‘Zero’ Problems for Astronomy, FORBES (Mar. 9, 2020, 7:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanocallaghan/2020/03/09/elon-musk-starlink-will-cause-zero-problems-forastronomy/?sh=6cf7efd036b7 [https://perma.cc/AKG3-HQJW].
40 See SpaceX to Make Starlink Satellites ‘Invisible’ After Light Pollution Complaints
from Astronomers, SKYNEWS (May 7, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://news.sky.com/story/
spacex-to-make-starlink-satellites-invisible-after-light-pollution-complaints-from-astronomers-11984439 [https://perma.cc/E4EF-57LN].
41 See Chaneil James, Dark-Coated Starlink Satellites Are Better but Not Perfect, Say
Astronomers, PHYSICS WORLD (Jan. 13, 2021), https://physicsworld.com/a/darkcoated-starlink-satellites-are-better-but-not-perfect-say-astronomers/#:~:text=IN
%20response%2C%20the%20third%20round,special%20anti%2Dreflective
%20dark%20coating [https://perma.cc/48GW-MAMX]; O’Callaghan, supra
note 39.
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portant details regarding space regulation: (1) NEPA has proved
one of the only viable routes to protect earthbound interests in
space, and (2) NEPA is hardly an ideal mechanism for protecting those interests. Distilled from those two points is a somewhat
obvious conclusion: Regulations that actually hold jurisdiction
in space should be put in place, through which earthbound
stakeholders may seek to protect their legitimate interests. More
on that is ahead.
Another prominent concern surrounding satellite mega-constellations is space debris.42 According to the European Space
Agency (ESA), there are more than 100 million debris objects
orbiting Earth, 36,500 of which are greater than 10 centimeters
in size.43 There are over 130 million pieces of space debris between 1 millimeter and 1 centimeter.44 While those objects are
small relative to the space they are in, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) points out that “[s]ince both
the debris and spacecraft are traveling at extremely high speeds
(approximately 15,700 mph in low Earth orbit), an impact of
even a tiny piece of orbital debris with a spacecraft could create
big problems.”45 Indeed, “[e]ven tiny paint flecks can damage a
spacecraft when traveling at these velocities.”46 Collisions between debris and spacecraft can add thousands of large pieces of
debris into orbit that can pose a threat for decades afterwards.47
Alarmingly, some estimates hold that the amount of space debris could increase 50 times by the end of the century.48
The major issue with space debris is that there comes a point
when the amount of debris in space reaches critical mass and
“cascades.”49 Known as the Kessler Syndrome, this phenomenon
is like a domino effect—one collision occurs in space, which creSee DANIEL MORGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45416, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDREGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND UTILIZATION 15 (2018) (“Debris in Earth orbit
poses a serious risk to both commercial and government spaceflight.”).
43 EUR. SPACE AGENCY, supra note 1.
44 Id.
45 Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, NASA (May 26, 2021), https://
www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html [https://
perma.cc/7B2B-EKXH].
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Jonathan O’Callaghan, What If Space Junk and Climate Change Become the Same
Problem?, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/12/science/space-junk-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/VS4W-SGV2].
49 Mike Wall, Kessler Syndrome and the Space Debris Problem, SPACE.COM (Nov. 15,
2021), https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris [https://
perma.cc/6FPF-R992].
42
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ates thousands of other objects that then hurtle around the
Earth at over 15,000 miles per hour, which in turn cause more
collisions until a belt of debris is left orbiting Earth.50 That scenario may sound overly bleak bordering on fatalistic, but it is a
primary concern among scientists and politicians alike.51 Space
debris is something operators are already having to deal with—
NASA has conducted a couple dozen maneuvers to avoid spacedebris collisions over the past two decades.52 In fact, some scientists are concerned the Kessler Syndrome process may have already started.53
Similarly, there is concern that launching so many aluminumbased satellites into space could cause unknown and undesirable effects on the Earth’s atmosphere and atmospheric composition.54 Satellites are mostly made of aluminum.55 When the
satellites burn up upon reentry, they release chemical pollutants
that damage the planet’s ozone layer.56 Interestingly, the added
aluminum content in the atmosphere could actually increase
the Earth’s reflective value, thereby cooling the planet by blocking the amount of UV light that enters the atmosphere.57 Some
scientists have posited that this could be a potential method for
counteracting global warming, but the scientific community at
large has dismissed the viability of the idea since the other effects of adding aluminum compounds into the atmosphere are
unknown.58 Importantly, reentry is the main form of space debris mitigation for low orbit satellites.59 In other words, reentry is
See id.
See id.; Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy,
83 Fed. Reg. 28969, 28969 (June 21, 2018) (“Today, space is becoming increasingly congested and contested, and that trend presents challenges for the safety,
stability, and sustainability of U.S. space operations.”).
52 See Wall, supra note 49.
53 See id.
54 Tereza Pultarova, Air Pollution from Reentering Megaconstellation Satellites Could
Cause Ozone Hole 2.0, SPACE.COM (June 7, 2021), https://www.space.com/starlinksatellite-reentry-ozone-depletion-atmosphere [https://perma.cc/XS58-YZV5].
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Mitigating Space Debris Generation, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, https://www.esa.int/
Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation [https://
perma.cc/Z75J-3LAD] (“In order to remove mass from densely populated orbits,
it is recommended that satellites and orbital stages be commanded to reenter
Earth’s atmosphere within 25 years of mission completion, if their deployment
orbit altitude is below 2000 km (in the LEO region).”); see also Project Kuiper Announces Plans and Launch Provider for Prototype Satellites, AMAZON (Nov. 1, 2021),
50
51
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a desirable result for satellites at the end of their lives in orbit.
Thus, the release of these chemicals is an intended, calculated
consequence of launching satellites into LEO.60
Disturbingly, part of the mitigation process for space debris
implemented by entities like SpaceX may actually end up making the space debris problem even worse because climate
change may be increasing the longevity of debris in space. Typically, over time, space debris enters Earth’s orbit, burns up, and
is no longer a collision threat.61 However, recent studies suggest
that climate change may be lessening the atmospheric drag that
ultimately brings objects into Earth’s atmosphere from low orbit.62 The research suggests that a worst-case scenario would reduce the atmospheric drag to the point where orbital lifetimes
could increase by up to forty years.63 The FCC relied on the assumption that atmospheric drag would help mitigate the space
debris problem when it authorized SpaceX to decrease Starlink’s orbit, the subject matter of the litigation between Viasat
and Dish against the FCC.64 If that assumption proves faulty and
the mitigation programs in place prove to be dramatically less
effective than anticipated, the results could be disastrous. Indeed, if space debris is left suspended in space for years longer
than expected at launch, a catastrophic Kessler Syndrome scenario is not a matter of “if” but “when.”65
This recent finding exemplifies how little is known about
space exploration and its potential repercussions. All this is to
say: Despite massive amounts of money and research, commercial space ventures can lead to unintended, unforeseen consequences. Moreover, where known consequences pose no threat
of liability exposure,66 operators may simply dismiss or ignore
those consequences.67
https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/innovation-at-amazon/project-kuiper-announces-plans-and-launch-provider-for-prototype-satellites [https://perma.cc/
BN3J-KKN2] (“Amazon is committed to being a responsible steward of Earth and
space . . . KuiperSat-1 and KuiperSat-2 are designed for atmospheric demise and
will be actively deorbited after the mission . . .”).
60 See Pultarova, supra note 54.
61 EUR. SPACE AGENCY, supra note 59.
62 See O’Callaghan, supra note 48.
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 See Wall, supra note 49.
66 See Foust, supra note 35.
67 See O’Callaghan, supra note 39.
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NEAR FUTURE

To better understand the scope of the booming commercial
satellite industry, it is helpful to discuss some of the key players
in the space-exploration game and their plans to construct satellite constellations. SpaceX, being one of the first and primary
actors to date and the focus of ongoing litigation, has already
been discussed to some extent in this Comment.68 SpaceX’s constellation project, Starlink, has multiple phases. Its first phase
will consist of 12,000 satellites,69 nearly 2,000 of which had been
launched by December 2021.70 The company aims to launch 50
payloads in 2022 with a few dozen satellites per payload.71
SpaceX is therefore planning to launch upwards of 2,500 more
satellites in 2022.72 The second phase will consist of up to 30,000
more satellites to be launched in the near future.73
Astra, a newcomer in the satellite space race,74 filed an application with the FCC in November 2021 requesting authorization
to launch over 13,600 LEO satellites for its constellation.75 Amazon’s Project Kuiper, currently in its early stages, appears to be
much smaller than Starlink—it hopes to deploy 3,236 satellites
into Earth’s lower orbit.76 Arianespace’s OneWeb plans to
launch 648 satellites into low orbit and has already launched
See discussion supra Part I & Sections II.A.–.B.
Pultarova, supra note 54.
70 See Amy Thompson, SpaceX Launches Falcon 9 Rocket on Record 11th Flight Carrying 52 Starlink Satellites, SPACE.COM (Dec. 18, 2021), https://www.space.com/
spacex-starlink-launch-record-falcon-9-11th-flight [https://perma.cc/RZN25DEK].
71 Jeff Foust, SpaceX Launches Starlink Satellites to Higher Orbit, SPACENEWS (Feb.
21, 2022), https://spacenews.com/spacex-launches-starlink-satellites-to-higherorbit/ [https://perma.cc/VN6J-B3PS].
72 See id.
73 Pultarova, supra note 54.
74 Mike Wall, Astra Goes Public, Becomes 1st Launch Company to Trade on NASDAQ,
SPACE.COM (June 30, 2021), https://www.space.com/astra-launch-company-public-nasdaq [https://perma.cc/A5WD-8M44].
75 Jeff Foust, Astra Files FCC Application for 13,600-Satellite Constellation,
SPACENEWS (Nov. 5, 2021), https://spacenews.com/astra-files-fcc-application-for13600-satellite-constellation/ [https://perma.cc/YDM2-CKHV].
76 See Adam Clark Estes, The Complicated Promise of Amazon’s Space Internet, VOX
(Nov. 3, 2021, 11:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2021/11/3/22761345/
project-kuiper-satellite-amazon-space-internet [https://perma.cc/2QLG-QSR3];
Michael Sheetz, Amazon Plans to Launch Its First Internet Satellites in Late 2022,
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/01/amazons-project-kuiper-launchingfirst-internet-satellites-in-q4-2022.html [https://perma.cc/U4PH-MF2K] (Nov. 1,
2021, 4:29 PM).
68
69
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more than half of them.77 Telesat, a Canadian company, seeks to
launch 298 satellites beginning in 2023.78 The FCC recently
granted Boeing authorization to build, launch, and operate 132
LEO satellites.79 LeoSat plans on launching 108 low orbit satellites.80 Many of these constellations are intended to provide
broadband internet, but one startup, Privateer, somewhat ironically plans to send “several hundred satellites” into space to
study space debris.81
Public entities are also looking at launching satellite megaconstellations. For instance, China has filed for international approval of a plan for almost 13,000 LEO satellites.82 While there is
no figure yet available for the number of planned satellites, the
European Union is in the planning stages for a $7.3 billion constellation project.83 The project is still in its early stages and
seems to be struggling to gain solid footing, but the project will
probably include about 100 satellites in LEO.84
Thus, there are roughly 75,000 satellites planned to go up
into space from private enterprises and public entities around
77 See Mike Wall, Arianespace Launches 36 New OneWeb Internet Satellites into Orbit
on Soyuz Rocket, SPACE.COM (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.space.com/arianespacesoyuz-rocket-oneweb-11-launch [https://perma.cc/4AYR-SPWP].
78 Steve Scherer, Canada’s Telesat Takes on Musk and Bezos in Space Race to Provide
Fast Broadband, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2021, 8:34 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
technology/canadas-telesat-takes-musk-bezos-space-race-provide-fast-broadband2021-04-11/ [https://perma.cc/5M6C-8EM5].
79 Dan Swinhoe, FCC Approves Boeing LEO Satellite Constellation, DATA CTR. DYNAMICS (Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/fcc-approves-boeing-leo-satellite-constellation/ [https://perma.cc/NM4B-U9ME].
80 See LEOSAT, https://www.leosat.com/ [https://perma.cc/BG9V-M825].
81 Mike Wall, Steve Wozniak’s Startup Privateer Plans to Launch Hundreds of Satellites to Study Space Debris, SPACE.COM (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.space.com/
steve-wozniak-privateer-hundreds-satellites-space-debris [https://perma.cc/J3VWEJTK].
82 See Andrew Jones, China Is Developing Plans for a 13,000-Satellite Megaconstellation, SPACENEWS (Apr. 21, 2021), https://spacenews.com/china-is-developingplans-for-a-13000-satellite-communications-megaconstellation/ [https://
perma.cc/NAY8-U5D7].
83 Jonathan O’Callaghan, Europe Wants to Build Its Own Satellite Mega Constellation to Rival SpaceX’s Starlink, FORBES (Dec. 23, 2020, 1:35 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanocallaghan/2020/12/23/europe-wants-to-buildits-own-satellite-mega-constellation-to-rival-spacexs-starlink/?sh=62f493981252
[https://perma.cc/D6FQ-JBR4].
84 See Jeff Foust, European Union Advances Broadband Constellation Despite Negative
Assessments, SPACENEWS (Feb. 16, 2022), https://spacenews.com/europeanunion-advances-broadband-constellation-despite-negative-assessments/ [https://
perma.cc/97DE-HTTW].
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the world in the near future.85 As will be explored in the Part III,
the regulatory framework that needs to be in place must address
numerous competing concerns as the industry matures. The
need for such a framework should be obvious from the preceding Sections—the planned satellite systems will dwarf the
roughly 14,000 satellites launched since the beginning of satellite use in space.86 Moreover, major players such as SpaceX are
moving forward at dizzying speeds and making the rules that
everyone else will have to play by as they go.87
The list of concerns in the previous Section has not been overlooked by these players or regulatory entities. Companies such
as SpaceX88 and Amazon89 are actively working to make collisions less likely by investing in onboard propulsion systems so
satellites can move out of the way of any incoming debris.
SpaceX is also researching and implementing methods to make
satellites less reflective to minimize interference with astronomical endeavors on Earth.90 However, relying on the goodwill of
private companies may not be an adequate answer moving forward, especially with so many different operators seeking to
send up an ever-growing number of satellites in orbit.91
III.

THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

A good understanding of the current legal framework is crucial for grasping how it is inadequate to handle the emergence
of satellite mega-constellations.92 The current international regSee supra notes 69–84 and accompanying text.
See Nibedita Mohanta, How Many Satellites Are Orbiting the Earth in 2021, GEOSPATIAL WORLD (May 28, 2021), https://www.geospatialworld.net/blogs/howmany-satellites-are-orbiting-the-earth-in-2021/.
87 Hollinger & Cookson, supra note 9; see generally Hjalte Osborn Frandsen,
Customary International Law as a Vessel for Global Accord: The Case of Customary Rulesof-the-Road for Governing the Orbital Highways of Earth, 87 J. AIR L. & COM. 705
(2022) (explaining the role that private actors could play in developing customary international law due to the increase in commercial space activity and lack of
adequate international governance).
88 Updates: Astronomy Discussion with National Academy of Sciences, SPACEX (Apr.
28, 2020), https://www.spacex.com/updates/starlink-update-04-28-2020/index.html [https://perma.cc/G3XP-34UT].
89 See KUIPER SYSTEMS LLC, REQUEST FOR EXPERIMENTAL AUTHORIZATION NARRASTATEMENT 41–42 (2021), https://apps.fcc.gov/els/GetAtt.html?id=
TIVE
285359&x= [https://perma.cc/L7B6-AQ9N].
90 James, supra note 41.
91 See supra Section II.C.
92 The information in this Part is nothing particularly new. Legal analysts such
as Christopher D. Johnson of the Secure World Foundation helpfully have laid
85
86

2022]

REGULATING SCIENCE FICTION

773

ulatory framework for space is actually fairly simple. In fact, it is
so straightforward that clarity is wanting and ambiguities are numerous.93 The primary governing document is the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, more commonly referred to as the Outer Space
Treaty (OST),94 promulgated by the United Nations in 1966 and
ratified by 111 nations at the close of 2021.95 The OST essentially allows states that are parties to the Treaty the right to freely
explore and use space subject to a few key limitations.96 Those
limitations bar sovereign states from appropriating space and
place certain affirmative obligations upon states, such as not polluting space with debris that could affect the climate on Earth
and not interfering with other states’ free use or exploration of
space.97 However, as an example of ambiguity in the treaty, the
OST offers no guidelines or clarification on what might actually
constitute “appropriation” of space.98
Important to the commercial space context, the OST makes
sovereign states liable for the actions of private entities within
those states that operate in space, and “the behavior of private
entities is also bound by the terms of the treaty.”99 Thus, private
entities operating in space “shall be guided by the principle of
co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their
activities in outer space . . . with due regard to the correspondout the framework of international space law in other publications. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8. This Part borrows heavily from the works of such commentators
to provide a lens through which a better framework may be envisioned.
93 See, e.g., Prakash Chandra, Outer Space Treaty Has Ambiguities Allowing Unhindered Exploitation of Celestial Bodies, ECON. TIMES, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/outer-space-treaty-has-ambiguities-allowingunhindered-exploitation-of-celestial-bodies/articleshow/46238718.cms [https://
perma.cc/B4DL-PYKY] (Feb. 14, 2015, 4:12 AM).
94 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer
Space Treaty].
95 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm.
on the Status and Application of the Five United Nations Treaties on Outer
Space, at 10, Sixtieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2021/CRP.10 (2021)
[hereinafter U.N. Status Report].
96 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. I; Johnson, supra note 8, at 4.
97 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 4–5.
98 See id. at 5.
99 Id. at 9 (citing Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. IX.).
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ing interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty;”100 they
“shall pursue studies of outer space . . . and conduct exploration
of [the moon and other celestial bodies] so as to avoid their
harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate
measures for this purpose;”101 and they shall not appropriate
space “by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.”102
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has
been an integral international governing entity for over a century and a half103 and has played a prominent role in space regulation.104 The ITU helps coordinate the frequencies at which
certain satellites communicate and the orbital positions of those
satellites.105 It is then left to organizations like the FCC that regulate frequency use on the national scale to implement the
ITU’s regulations.106 International governing entities like the
ITU are essential to the free use of space because they act as a
single point of reference that ensures nations comply with their
“obligations of cooperation, mutual assistance, and due regard”
owed under the OST.107 The ITU has played a very prominent
role in the issuance of orbital slots and coordination of geostationary satellites due to the nature of those satellites—there are
a limited number of slots for geostationary satellites, so international coordination is necessary to avoid conflict.108 However,
since Earth’s lower orbit is not nearly as limited as its geostationary orbit, international regulation regarding the lower orbit has
been largely unnecessary until now and is therefore significantly
lacking.109
Since states are responsible to all other states party to the
OST, the U.S. government must ensure compliance with the
100 Cf. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. IX (noting that party states are
bound by those obligations).
101 Cf. id.
102 Cf. id. art. II.
103 History, ITU, https://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/history.aspx [https://
perma.cc/ML9E-CT8J].
104 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 9.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See id.
108 Id. at 10–11.
109 Id. at 11.
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OST or face exposure to liability,110 which can be great considering the scope and cost of many space projects.111 Thus, the regulatory framework in the United States should revolve around
such compliance, at least as a baseline.112 The primary federal
agencies involved with overseeing and authorizing space operations are the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Departments of Commerce and State, and the FCC.113 There are
some other involved agencies, but their functions do not warrant in depth discussion here.114 The functions of the FAA, FCC,
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) within the Commerce Department are most relevant to
this Comment and will be discussed more fully below.
The FAA, through the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST), “licenses commercial launch and reentry vehicles
(i.e., rockets and spaceplanes) as well as commercial spaceports.”115 AST was established “to ensure compliance with international obligations of the United States, and to protect the
public health and safety, safety of property, and national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States.”116 Commercial
launches—i.e., launches by private entities and not performed
through a contract with NASA117—are relatively new. The first
licensed launch occurred in 1989,118 over 20 years after the
United States signed the OST.119 As an apparent reflection of
the OST liability language, the FAA requires insurance before it
will license launches, with the government agreeing to indem-

110 See generally Edwin Kisiel, Law as an Instrument to Solve the Orbital Debris Problem, 51 ENV’T L. 223, 228–229 (2021).
111 The Hubble Space Telescope mission alone, for example, has cost around
$16 billion. See, e.g., Brian Dunbar, About – Facts Hubble FAQs, NASA, https://
www.nasa.gov/content/about-facts-hubble-faqs [https://perma.cc/NSH7-TD2D]
(May 5, 2022).
112 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 7–10.
113 DANIEL MORGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45416, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL
REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND UTILIZATION 2 (2018).
114 See id. at 2–14.
115 Id. at 1.
116 About the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/
about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast [https://perma.cc/Y2DF-QXKS].
117 MORGAN, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND UTILIZATION 2.
118 Id. at 3.
119 See U.N. Status Report, supra note 95, at 9.
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nify the launch company for any loss that exceeds the statutory
cap of $500 million.120
Importantly, there has been recent regulatory reform in the
FAA/AST licensing process. The reform streamlined the licensing process and decreased regulatory burdens.121 The reform
implements a “performance-based” approach to safety compliance, “giving launch companies the flexibility to propose alternative ways to meet safety requirements.”122 Moreover, the
industry is seeking further deregulation by streamlining the environmental review process.123
While the FAA licenses space flight, the FCC licenses commercial satellite communications because all satellites communicate
through radio frequencies.124 The FCC has had authority to regulate radio use since the agency’s inception in 1934.125 Since
practically all satellites communicate via radio waves, regulating
satellites falls under the FCC’s broad authority to regulate radio
frequencies.126 The FCC is also required to implement regulations promulgated by the ITU, which, as discussed above, holds
an important coordination role in the international space regulatory scheme.127 Because the ITU has no real restrictions on
LEO licensing concerning frequency regulation and orbital slot
allocation, and because there is no concrete definition of space
appropriation, the FCC can virtually license as many satellites as
it desires while remaining in compliance with international obligations.128 Further, “FCC licensing procedures for satellites
sometimes go beyond the direct regulation of radio frequency
use” because of the agency’s broad statutory authority to issue
licenses.129 Indeed, the FCC has a prominent role in overseeing
debris mitigation.130
MORGAN, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND UTILI5.
121 Jeff
Foust, FAA Publishes Streamlined Commercial Launch Regulations,
SPACENEWS (Oct. 16, 2020), https://spacenews.com/faa-publishes-streamlinedcommercial-launch-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/BW8T-XNQG].
122 Id.
123 See id.
124 See MORGAN, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND
UTILIZATION 11.
125 Id. at 11–12.
126 See id. at 12.
127 Id. at 1–12.
128 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 11.
129 See MORGAN, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND
UTILIZATION 12.
130 Id.
120
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In 2020, the FCC streamlined the licensing process for small
satellites.131 The regulation expedites and makes significantly
cheaper the process for obtaining licenses for qualified small
satellites.132 The intent of the regulation was to lower the barriers for small satellite providers and operators to get to space.133
In other words, licensing through the FCC, like the FAA, is being streamlined and moderately deregulated.
Finally, NOAA is playing an important role in space-exploration regulation because it is developing the Open-Architecture
Data Repository (OADR), which is a database that will supplement government data with commercial data on orbital objects
to provide a more comprehensive tracking and warning system
for orbital operators.134 The service will be free and will provide
a basic database for use by the commercial industry domestically
and abroad while leaving open the possibility for the industry to
expand on that database and provide more robust services.135
Interestingly, the United States has a National Space Council
chaired by many of the nation’s top officials; it is intended to
coordinate and monitor the efforts of the numerous agencies
involved in space regulation.136 Even more interestingly, the
Council has been inactive for most of its existence.137 Having
only been reestablished in 2017138—and meeting for the first
time only a few months before the first Starlink launch139—the
Council entered the regulation of LEO satellite constellations a
131 Streamlining Licensing Procedures for Small Satellites, 34 FCC Rcd. 13077,
13078 (2019); Streamlining Licensing Procedures for Small Satellites, 35 FCC
Rcd. 4934, 4934 (2020); Jeff Foust, FCC Streamlined Smallsat Licensing Regulations
Published, SPACENEWS (Aug. 12, 2020), https://spacenews.com/fcc-streamlinedsmallsat-licensing-regulations-published/ [https://perma.cc/4EFA-JND7].
132 Foust, supra note 131.
133 Id.
134 See Rahul Rao, Avoiding Satellite Collisions: NOAA Unveils Prototype Warning
System, SPACE.COM (Feb. 21, 2022), https://www.space.com/noaa-satellite-collision-warning-system-prototype [https://perma.cc/5TLG-MGML]; Jeff Foust,
NOAA Seeking Information on Commercial Space Situational Awareness Data,
SPACENEWS (Feb. 23, 2022), https://spacenews.com/noaa-seeking-informationon-commercial-space-situational-awareness-data/ [https://perma.cc/WQB3675J].
135 Foust, supra note 134.
136 DANIEL MORGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45416, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL
REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND UTILIZATION 14 (2018).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 National Space Council Meeting – Oct. 5, 2017, NASA (Dec. 8, 2017), https://
www.nasa.gov/feature/national-space-council-meeting-oct-5-2017 [https://
perma.cc/64R2-W3E4].
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little late in the game. Regardless of its late entrance, the Council and its member agencies have been charged with revamping
important space traffic monitoring and debris mitigation
policies.140
As discussed above, space debris presents a serious and wellrecognized threat to current and future space exploration.141
There are four guiding principles that all government agencies
involved in space operations are obligated to follow regarding
debris mitigation: “[1] Minimize or eliminate the debris released during normal operations. [2] Minimize accidental explosions. [3] Minimize opportunities for collisions. [4] Dispose
of spacecraft and launch vehicle components at the end of mission life.”142 Interestingly, the FCC is supposed to follow all four
principles, while generally the FAA only has to minimize accidental explosions.143
Since space debris and debris mitigation are of paramount
importance to the space industry, it follows naturally that situational awareness and traffic management in space are initiatives
of equal import.144 Space situational awareness (SSA) involves
tracking all satellites and known debris, and space traffic management (STM) uses that data to avoid potential collisions.145
Once controlled by the Department of Defense, civil STM operations are now under the purview of the Commerce Department, specifically the Office of Space Commerce (OSC).146
However, since that transfer of authority in 2018, and under a
140 See Vice President Harris Convenes Renewed National Space Council, OFF. OF
SPACE COM. (Dec. 1, 2021), https://www.space.commerce.gov/vice-president-harris-convenes-renewed-national-space-council/ [https://perma.cc/3XCA-367M];
THE WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES SPACE PRIORITIES FRAMEWORK 7 (2021), https:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/United-States-Space-Priorities-Framework-_-December-1-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/B84L-DJM2]; Space
Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy, 83 Fed. Reg.
28969, 28969 (June 21, 2018).
141 See discussion supra Section II.B; MORGAN, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL
REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND UTILIZATION 15.
142 See MORGAN, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND
UTILIZATION 15.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 16.
145 Id.
146 See Jeff Foust, Senate Appropriators Frustrated with Lack of Progress on Civil Space
Traffic Management, SPACENEWS (Oct. 20, 2021), https://spacenews.com/senateappropriators-frustrated-with-lack-of-progress-on-civil-space-traffic-management/
[https://perma.cc/UM6V-YXHQ].
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directive to revamp STM operations,147 OSC has failed to produce an adequate framework for STM.148 Currently, Congress is
contemplating further organizational change to give OSC better
direction so that it may make quicker progress on its STM initiatives.149 Thus, in the intervening four years since President
Trump’s Directive that the United States needs to develop “operational standards and best practices to promote safe and responsible behavior in space,”150 it appears very little
development has actually occurred.
While the government has been floundering to come up with
a framework that adequately addresses the growing debris issues
in space, private startups have started tackling the problem. Startups such as Scout Space and Kayhan Space are developing
more accurate space debris tracking systems and traffic management software.151 Other startups like Privateer are planning to
launch their own satellite constellations, the sole purpose of
which is to track and monitor other orbiting objects.152
In short, the government’s regulatory framework concerning
SSA and STM is experiencing some immense growing pains,
struggling to keep up with emergent technologies and the industry push towards commercializing Earth’s lower orbit. Meanwhile, private entities are fully capitalizing on that regulatory
gap to provide better SSA and STM services in the absence of
clearly defined regulatory standards and best practices.153
The dynamic between private and public approaches to SSA
and STM operations is representative of the broader current
struggle to regulate space. As the foregoing discussion suggests,
responsibility for space regulation is spread over at least half a
dozen major government agencies,154 which is patently ineffi147 Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy, 83
Fed. Reg. 28969, 28971 (June 21, 2018).
148 Foust, supra note 146.
149 See id.
150 Space Policy Directive-3, 83 Fed. Reg. at 28971.
151 Sandra Erwin, Startups Developing Space Traffic Monitoring System to Help Manage Growing Debris Problem, SPACENEWS (Nov. 16, 2021), https://spacenews.com/
startups-developing-space-traffic-monitoring-system-to-help-manage-growing-debris-problem/ [https://perma.cc/PV9S-VVZ5].
152 Wall, supra note 81.
153 See id.; Erwin, supra note 151.
154 See Kelcee Griffis, Broadband Sats Are Filling the Sky. Are Regulators Ready?
LAW360 (July 19, 2021, 3:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1404323/
broadband-sats-are-filling-the-sky-are-regulators-ready- [https://perma.cc/Q2RC5RNB].
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cient: Either an agency promulgates its own rules for space debris mitigation and runs the risk of conflicting with other
agencies’ rules on space debris mitigation or the agency waits
around to see what the others do to avoid passing conflicting
rules.155 Under the first approach, the industry is left to waste
resources untangling and complying with a web of conflicting
rules.156 Common sense dictates that under the second approach, many agencies may forego rulemaking measures that
they may deem immediately necessary in favor of presenting a
clear and cohesive set of rules across many agencies.157 Meanwhile, the private industry is free to operate within the outdated
system as it currently exists, fully taking advantage of the lack of
government-imposed rules, safety standards, and best practices
governing Earth’s lower orbit.158
IV.

ANALYSIS

The space regulatory framework, both domestically and internationally, simply was not prepared to take on the surge of massive non-geostationary satellite constellations in lower Earth
orbit, and the U.S. government seems fully cognizant of that
fact.159 The total number of satellites launched into space before
2019 pales in comparison to the some 75,000 satellites that are
slated to launch in the near future.160 Although America seeks
to “maintain U.S. leadership in space” by developing regulations
that reflect the rapidly growing industry,161 there seems to be a
distinct lack of clear direction among the myriad federal agen155 See Kelcee Griffis, FCC Backs Off of Aggressive Space Junk Regulations, LAW360
(Apr. 23, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1266880?scroll=1&related=1 [https://perma.cc/YTT9-GZEN].
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 See id.; Hollinger & Cookson, supra note 9.
159 See Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy, 83
Fed. Reg. 28969, 28969 (June 21, 2018) (“Emerging commercial ventures such
as . . . new technologies enabling small satellites and very large constellations of
satellites[ ] are increasingly outpacing efforts to develop and implement government policies and processes to address these new activities.”); Press Release, FCC,
Chairwoman Rosenworcel Welcomes Bipartisan Satellite Legislation (Feb. 11,
2022), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-380229A1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ERG3-HLJF] (“While the FCC staff has done tremendous work in reviewing applications and simultaneously updating our rules from orbital debris to
commercial space launch communications, the truth is that the laws were written
to address a different satellite ecosystem.”).
160 See discussion supra Part II.
161 See Space Policy Directive-3, 83 Fed. Reg. at 28969.
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cies charged with accomplishing that goal. In the meantime, the
industry has been left largely to manage itself and has successfully fought for increased self-regulatory freedom.162 There is no
real question that the space industry is outpacing its regulatory
counterpart, racing ahead while the government struggles to
catch up.
Self-regulation is nothing particularly new—with the rise of
the administrative state, agencies are increasingly taking on the
role of facilitator rather than regulator.163 Regulatory entities do
not have the resources to effectively oversee every aspect of
space exploration.164 Thus, there must be action by the industry to
not merely comply with existing regulations but to ensure that
their ventures are sustainable for long-term space exploration.
This action by the industry must be supported by the government as much as possible to facilitate and coordinate the various
aspects of space operation.
Given that space regulation is trending towards self-regulation, Part IV will analyze the various benefits and negative aspects of self-regulation as it has been implemented to date. It
will then provide a proposal for what could be done to modify
that system to ensure the longevity of the space-exploration industry while protecting the interests of other stakeholders.
A.

THE PROS

Don’t Look Up, the latest doomsday satire, provides an apt representation of what many fear about self-regulating industries:
Private, profit-driven enterprises will invariably cut corners and
skirt regulatory lines to increase profits, even in the face of disaster.165 When the government sanctions—or even encourages—
Foust, supra note 121.
See, e.g., VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 10–11 (2001) (“Governments increasingly view their own roles as that of facilitators of market expansion and
competitiveness.”).
164 See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Not Just Airplanes: Why the Government Often Lets Industry Regulate Itself, NPR (Apr. 4, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/
04/709431845/faa-is-not-alone-in-allowing-industry-to-self-regulate [https://
perma.cc/S5K4-ZJDQ]; Space Policy Directive-3, 83 Fed. Reg. at 28969.
165 See DON’T LOOK UP (Hyperobject Industries & Bluegrass Films 2021); see
also Clifford Krauss, Manny Fernandez, Ivan Penn & Rick Rojas, How Texas’ Drive
for Energy Independence Set It Up for Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/02/21/us/texas-electricity-ercot-blackouts.html [https://perma.cc/YY3MYGYR] (June 15, 2021) (tracing Texas’s deregulation of its energy industry to the
statewide freeze in February 2021 that left millions freezing and without power).
162
163
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that behavior, there may be reasonable cause for concern.166 In
the wake of movies like Don’t Look Up and news-propagating disasters such as the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill167 and the
Boeing 737 MAX crashes in 2018 and 2019,168 it can be hard to
place much faith in the goodwill of private companies to do
what is best, not just for themselves but for all interested parties.
However, the space industry’s capacity to regulate itself should
not be quickly dismissed. Commercial space enterprises have a
vested interest in maintaining a space environment that is free
of excessive debris and safe to operate in—without it, their businesses are doomed.169 Moreover, industry-guided standards and
best practices are already common in federal regulation and
have operated without much criticism for most of the past century, absent a few significant exceptions.170
Allowing industries to primarily regulate themselves offers several notable benefits. First, certification processes are much
quicker. Indeed, delays in certification processes are often why
industries push for broad regulatory autonomy.171 Second, federal agencies simply do not have the financial or workforce resources to adequately perform all the supervision that industries
currently undertake themselves.172 Further, self-regulated industries have the intrinsic benefit of not being overregulated, a
problem that can add unnecessary costs to operators and impede innovation.173
See Krauss et al., supra note 165.
See generally Richard Pallardy, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Deepwater-Horizon-oil-spill [https://
perma.cc/7L4W-6AV7] (Aug. 23, 2022) (providing background information on
the spill).
168 See generally Patrice Taddonio, In 737 Max Crashes, Boeing Pointed to Pilot Error—Despite a Fatal Design Flaw, FRONTLINE PBS (Sept. 14, 2021), https://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/video-clip-boeing-737-max-crashes-fatal-design-flaw-documentary/ [https://perma.cc/W5Z6-A8SK] (providing background
information on the crashes); see also DOWNFALL: THE CASE AGAINST BOEING (Imagine Documentaries 2022).
169 See discussion supra Part II.
170 See Naylor, supra note 164.
171 See, e.g., Aaron C. Davis & Marina Lopes, How the FAA Allows Jetmakers to ‘Self
Certify’ That Planes Meet U.S. Safety Requirements, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2019, 9:25
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-the-faa-allows-jet
makers-to-self-certify-that-planes-meet-us-safety-requirements/2019/03/15/96d24
d4a-46e6-11e9-90f0-0ccfeec87a61_story.html [https://perma.cc/5CXQ-VDSL].
172 Naylor, supra note 164.
173 See DANIEL CASTRO, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., BENEFITS AND
LIMITATIONS OF INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING
166
167
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However, not all self-regulatory frameworks are created equal.
A global look at the regulation of food and drugs provides a
poignant example. Many countries allow their food and drug
industries to self-regulate.174 The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) framework in the United States allows big pharmaceutical companies to advertise directly to consumers and is
fraught with opportunities for those companies to present the
public with “potentially misleading advertisements before the
FDA discovers the breach.”175 Indeed, over half of these advertisements’ most emphasized claims were found to be potentially
misleading.176 In contrast, New Zealand—the only other country
that allows pharmaceutical companies to advertise directly to
consumers177—is fully compliant with its code despite being
largely self-regulated.178
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA) in the United States publishes guidelines with stricter
standards than the FDA requires, and many pharmaceutical
companies voluntarily comply with PhRMA guidelines.179 However, there are only minor enforcement measures in place for
those voluntary commitments.180 New Zealand’s drug industry
and advertising industry work together with the government to
ensure code compliance.181 Where the FDA does not impose
any penalties for noncompliance with its stricter-than-necessary
guidelines, the New Zealand media industry will not allow
noncompliant advertisements to be disseminated to the public.182 The “voluntary” vetting process is effectively mandatory,
however, because the media industry will not disseminate advertising materials unless the voluntary vetting association has given
5 (2011), https://itif.org/files/2011-self-regulation-online-behavioral-advertising.pdf [https://perma.cc/955M-CNNY].
174 See Chris Lo, Drug Promotion: Does Self-Regulation Work?, PHARM. TECH. (June
28, 2015), https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/featuredrugpromotion-does-self-regulation-work-4606510/ [https://perma.cc/NRW7-SZSX].
175 See Erin J. Asher, Lessons Learned from New Zealand: Pro-Active Industry Shift
Towards Self-Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Will Improve Compliance with
the FDA, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 599, 619 (2006).
176 Chris Lo, Big Pharma and the Ethics of TV Advertising, PHARM. TECH., https://
www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/feature-big-pharma-ethics-of-tvadvertising/ [https://perma.cc/HXK2-V5AL] (Jan. 31, 2020, 1:50 PM).
177 Id.
178 Asher, supra note 175, at 600–01, 620.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 618.
181 Id. at 601.
182 Id. at 614–17.
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its stamp of approval.183 Thus, there is a built-in incentive for
compliance—if an independent reviewing board does not approve of a company’s material, the material will go nowhere.184
Further, the FDA’s preapproval process for advertisement material is much slower than New Zealand’s private counterpart, and
the United States does not require preapproval while New Zealand does.185 Thus, there are much stronger incentives for full
compliance in New Zealand than in the United States, and that
is largely a biproduct of how self-regulation operates in each
country.186
There are a couple of important lessons to be learned from
the comparison between the United States’ and New Zealand’s
drug advertising industries. First, voluntary commitment without
enforcement is not very effective. The United States has issues
with noncompliance with its voluntary commitments because
the worst that happens is a light slap on the wrist for violating
those commitments.187 On the other hand, New Zealand enforces its code compliance by simply disallowing the dissemination of noncompliant materials.188 That vetting process is
particularly intriguing—a similar vetting process in the United
States could be extremely effective for space regulation. Second,
how self-regulatory frameworks are structured—i.e., how much
and what kind of power is delegated to the industry—is an important factor in whether the framework performs adequately.
Indeed, as the cons below will illustrate further, it is vitally important to be preemptive in a regulatory framework rather than
reactive.
B.

THE CONS

Self-regulation may be common in industries that the federal
government oversees, but that does not always mean it is desirable. One of the main problems with self-regulation is that it is
often retrospective and responsive to social pressure rather than
preemptive.189 For instance, the oil and gas industry adopted the
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies’ Principles on Environmental Responsibility only after the Ex183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id.
See
Id.
See
See
Id.
See

at 617.
id.
at 601, 618–19.
id. at 616–17.
id. at 618.
at 617.
id. at 621.
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xon–Valdez oil spill sparked public outrage, especially among
environmentalists.190
The FAA provides another illuminating example. The FAA allowed Boeing to conduct a lot of its own testing for the Boeing
737 MAX jets.191 That same type of jet led to the tragic deaths of
346 individuals between two separate crashes.192 Boeing did not
contest the charge that it defrauded the United States by intentionally deceiving the FAA during the 737 MAX certification
process.193 Boeing knew and lied about the problems it found
with its 737 MAX aircraft.194 Boeing paid $2.5 billion in criminal
penalties.195 The FAA reformed its safety standards and certification process, as directed by Congress, in response to its lack of
oversight regarding the 737 MAX.196 One important lesson from
the Boeing/FAA incident is apparent: When left to regulate
themselves, private entities may be more heavily influenced by
factors other than safety or the public good when those entities
have invested millions, if not billions, in a particular project.197
Another failure of the self-regulation approach is noteworthy:
The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement allowed
offshore oil rigs to do their own annual certifications, which led
to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in
190 HAUFLER, supra note 163, at 9; Mindy S. Lubber, 30 Years Later, Investors Still
Lead the Way on Sustainability, CERES (Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.ceres.org/
news-center/blog/30-years-later-investors-still-lead-way-sustainability [https://
perma.cc/GZ56-2U6W].
191 See Naylor, supra note 164.
192 Ben Kesslen, 737 Max Crashes That Killed 346 Were ‘Horrific Culmination’ of
Failures by Boeing and FAA, House Report Says, NBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2020, 7:30 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/737-max-crashes-killed-346-were-horrific-culmination-failures-boeing-n1240192 [https://perma.cc/7DZD-GXGK].
193 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Boeing Charged with 737 Max Fraud
Conspiracy and Agrees to Pay over $2.5 Billion (Jan. 7, 2021), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-agreespay-over-25-billion [https://perma.cc/P8XH-FBDJ].
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 David Shepardson, FAA to Reform New Airplane Safety Approvals After 737 MAX
Crashes, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2020, 7:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usboeing-737max-congress/faa-to-reform-new-airplane-safety-approvals-after-737max-crashes-idUSKBN29304N [https://perma.cc/RGY3-TSKS].
197 See, e.g., John Cassidy, How Boeing and the F.A.A. Created the 737 MAX Catastrophe, NEW YORKER (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/how-boeing-and-the-faa-created-the-737-max-catastrophe
?gclsrc=AW.ds&gclid=CJ0KCQjwnvOaBhDTARIsAJf8eVP3NB6BNABbjoLDz9S1
blzcImt97NBjtLLSDo7y1K6lakpcSzUc9FQaAgIBEALw_wcB&gclsrc=AW.ds
[https://perma.cc/5L5Q-6FJD].
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2010.198 The explosion that caused the spill killed eleven workers and allowed natural gas and oil to flow freely into the gulf
for eighty-seven days.199 Predictably, the disaster sparked a wave
of regulatory reform “designed to better balance environmental
and safety concerns with energy development.”200 A trend is apparent from the preceding three examples: Disaster first, regulatory reform after.
Generally speaking, this may be a workable, if somewhat concerning, model in which the private and public sectors operate.
As discussed above, industries—not regulatory entities—tend to
have the technical knowledge and resources to dictate best practices and standards.201 The risk that industries will not implement perfect safety standards is inherent in the system. Indeed,
overly restrictive safety standards would make many business
ventures completely unviable.202 Moreover, extremely technical
industries, including the space industry, are precisely the ones
that are in the best position to inform regulatory entities of best
practices and safety standards. However, space exploration poses
certain risks that simply cannot be dealt with after disaster occurs. Unlike isolated airplane crashes and oil spills—tragic
though they are—a collision in space could quickly escalate into
a problem that renders further space exploration impossible.203
Post-disaster regulatory reform would be useless after a KesslerSyndrome-inducing incident. Thus, oversight must not be delegated entirely to the industry. However, that is almost exactly
what is happening.
198 See generally Sheldon Richman, Self-Regulation in the Corporate State: The BP
Spill, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC., https://fee.org/articles/self-regulation-in-the-corporate-state-the-bp-spill/ [https://perma.cc/7CRU-MQW7] (May 18, 2010).
199 HANA VIZCARRA, HARV. L. SCH., DEEPWATER HORIZON TEN YEARS LATER: REVIEWING AGENCY AND REGULATORY REFORMS 1 (2020), http://eelp.law.harvard.edu
/wp-content/uploads/Deepwater-Horizon-Ten-Years-Later-v4_Final.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/GW5E-FBBS].
200 Id. at 2.
201 See Section IV.A.; see also Naylor, supra note 164.
202 Consider Judge Learned Hand’s famous B<PL formula for determining
negligence: public policy does not demand that people exercise maximum care,
only that people exercise care such that the probability of injury (P) multiplied
by the magnitude of the injury (L) does not outweigh the burden (B) of taking a
proposed safety measure. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.). The effect of this formula in helping to determine
the standard of care is that businesses need not take every measure at great expense to avoid unlikely or insubstantial injury—an effect with crucial implications
for the viability of business ventures.
203 See discussion supra Part III.
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Since President Trump took office in 2016, the regulatory
state has become much more deregulated.204 Specifically,
spurred by complaints from the space industry, Trump explicitly
directed agencies to streamline operator licensing and certification processes, allowing the industry quicker and easier access to
space by reducing regulatory burdens.205 While these directives
helped the industry by clarifying complicated and confusing regulations, they also reinforced the government’s position as a
market facilitator (as opposed to a regulatory overseer) because
“these changes [sought to] encourage the growth and competitiveness of U.S. commercial space companies by easing regulations and speeding up approval processes.”206
These regulatory reforms largely consolidated and clarified
unwieldy, redundant, and confusing formal requirements that
have long frustrated the industry and obfuscated access to
space.207 Streamlining and updating burdensome regulatory formalities is not much cause for concern. However, there is an apparent lack of substantive requirements to gain access to space,
especially regarding large satellite constellations. As the recent
Viasat litigation against the FCC illustrates, the substantive requirements for regulating tens of thousands of small satellites
leave a lot to be desired.208 For instance, companies applying for
a license to operate a commercial satellite must complete Form
312, the FCC’s application for satellite space stations. The form
asks only one question of applicants regarding the environment:
“Would a Commission grant of any proposal in this application
or amendment have a significant environmental impact as defined by 47 CFR 1.1307?” As none of the FCC’s three exceptions
to categorical exclusion apply to orbiting commercial satellites,
applicants can simply answer “no,” as SpaceX did when it initially applied for approval for Starlink’s first 4,425 satellites. Per
the FCC’s regulations, this negative response from the applicant
completes the FCC’s compliance with NEPA.209
VIZCARRA, supra note 199, at 1.
Space Policy Directive-2, Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of
Space, 83 Fed. Reg. 24901, 24901 (May 24, 2018); Todd Harrison & Kaitlyn Johnson, How Might Space Policy Directive 2 Affect Commercial Space?, AEROSPACE SEC.
(May 30, 2018), https://aerospace.csis.org/how-might-space-policy-directive-2-affect-commercial-space/ [https://perma.cc/M52A-HHLN]; see also discussion
supra Part III.
206 Harrison & Johnson, supra note 205.
207 See, e.g., Foust, supra note 121.
208 See discussion supra Section II.B.
209 Ryan, supra note 10, at 931 (footnotes omitted).
204
205
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Indeed, the fact that NEPA is one of the main vessels through
which the alleged substantive deficiencies of a proposed or
ongoing space operation can be challenged is—to put it mildly—
kind of baffling.210
Moreover, the race to launch so many satellites so quickly into
LEO is alarming because it demonstrates a lack of caution on
behalf of the space industry. Despite SpaceX CEO Elon Musk’s
claim that there is room for “tens of billions” of satellites in
space211—a statement that is concerning for a number of reasons212—the unknown and unintended consequences of space
exploration require caution and preparation.213 For example,
SpaceX did not foresee that its original satellite design would
reflect so much light back towards Earth that it would cause
light pollution problems.214 The company is now addressing the
issue, but only after public outcry.215 The point here is not that
the industry must meet some perfect standard of care, but that
these companies are not infallible nor can they fully predict the
effects their operations will have on other stakeholders—for example, earthbound astronomers whose works are being disrupted by added light pollution from satellites.
210 See Atkinson, supra note 11; ELLIS, supra note 14, at 2; see also discussion
supra Part I & Section II.B.
211 Kate Duffy, Elon Musk Says There Is Room for ‘Tens of Billions’ of Satellites, After
Facing Criticism from Europe that SpaceX Is Blocking Out Rivals in Orbit, BUS. INSIDER
(Dec. 30, 2021, 4:34 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-rejectseurope-criticism-starlink-satellites-blocks-rivals-space-2021-12 [https://perma.cc/
L5WW-PT8A].
212 Not the least of which is that Musk extrapolated that number from the
number of cars on Earth, which he estimated at about 2 billion. See id. Based on
that number and the fact that space’s orbital shell is indeed quite a bit larger
than Earth, Musk estimated that space could house “tens of billions” of satellites.
Id. However, he apparently forgot the key concern with a crowded space environment—satellite crashes do not leave their debris sitting on the side of the road as
car crashes do in the hypothetical; they send thousands of pieces of varying sizes
of debris hurtling around Earth at 17,100 mph. See Wall, supra note 49. Another
important fact missing from Musk’s estimate is that there are nearly 7 million car
accidents each year in America alone. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS ANNUAL REPORT (2022), https://cdan.nhtsa.gov/tsftables/
National%20Statistics.pdf [https://perma.cc/99RN-WXP9]. Even if the most
minute fraction of that collision rate was replicated in space, it would be utterly
disastrous. See discussion supra Section II.B.
213 See, e.g., Letter from Kathy Smith, Chief Couns., NASA, to Marlene Dortch,
Sec’y, FCC 1 (Feb. 8, 2022), https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/
2022/02/NTIA-NASA-and-NSF-Fi.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EDY-TM6L] [hereinafter NASA Letter].
214 See SKYNEWS, supra note 40.
215 See id.
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Enter the need for swift government guidance and a better
regulatory system to act as a check on the industry as it proceeds
to self-regulate. The government’s role in space regulation must
be more hands-on than simply being a “facilitator[ ] of market
expansion and competitiveness.”216 The stakes are too high and
the margin for error is too slim to allow the industry complete
control in testing the outer limits of what regulations should be
in place. That does not, however, mean that the industry should
be left without a say. As has been made clear by this point, the
government does not have the resources to adequately oversee
all aspects of space regulation, but there are steps that could be
taken to reduce the government’s regulatory burden in some
areas, thereby leaving more resources available in other, more
pressing areas. This could be done by continuing to streamline
formal requirements that are outdated and cumbersome, lessening the government’s burden on unnecessary and redundant administrative formalities while making those resources open for
more important substantive oversight.
The pros and cons listed above cannot serve as a guide for
whether or not to “choose” self-regulation as the ideal regulatory structure for space exploration because there is no real
choice here—like all complex industries, the space industry
must self-regulate to some extent.217 Rather, the foregoing discussion serves as a discourse on what can be learned about selfregulation, its shortcomings, and how it can be better implemented to ensure the longevity of space exploration. It is hard
to tell how effective or ineffective self-regulation is in practice.218
It is easy to look at a few extreme examples where the system
failed and write off industry self-regulation as fundamentally
flawed.219 Regardless, it is a system the general public has caught
onto just recently despite its prevalence in the regulatory system
for the better part of the last century.220 Self-regulation is
quickly becoming the norm as the administrative state grows
See generally HAUFLER, supra note 163, at 10–11.
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
218 See Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than
Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 387
(2010) (“[T]he paucity of research on the effects of self-regulatory structures
springs from the difficulty of obtaining data on both the existence of internal
compliance structures and the outcomes they produce.”).
219 See discussion supra Section IV.B.
220 Naylor, supra note 164; see also Anil K. Gupta & Lawrence J. Tad, Industry
Self-Regulation: An Economic, Organizational, and Political Analysis, 8 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 416, 418 (1983).
216
217
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ever larger.221 Perhaps “self-regulation has largely gone on unnoticed, because, with a few exceptions, it has been a success.”222
C.

A WAY FORWARD: CLOSELY MONITORED SELF-REGULATION

While this Comment was being drafted, Congress started picking up on the need for swift and effective regulatory reform.
Two Representatives have recently proposed a bipartisan bill
that would streamline the formal processes of licensing while
making the substantive inquiries into space debris mitigation
more rigorous.223 That kind of reform reflects the main thrust of
this Comment. Streamlining formal requirements while maintaining substantively rigorous requirements is the best way forward in the space regulatory context. Further, as the current
litigation against the FCC illustrates, NEPA has been one of the
only mechanisms through which substantive challenges can be
made against alleged deficiencies of space operations.224 That
should not be the case. Thus, as a possible reformatory model,
this Comment proposes that (1) the industry should adopt
stricter safety standards than are legally required; (2) licensing
entities should be consolidated into a single agency; (3) an entity like NASA should assume a technical coordinative and collaborative role in the regulatory scheme such that it can act as a
regulatory liaison between other agencies and the industry; and
(4) legislation should be put into place that can adequately provide a mechanism for other stakeholders to air their concerns,
thereby enforcing compliance and developing substantive requirements for space operation.
The key to successful self-regulation in the space industry is
recognizing that the massive self-regulatory failures such as
Deepwater Horizon and the 737 MAX catastrophes are incidents
the commercial space industry simply cannot afford. Proactivity,
not reactivity, must be the starting point and the absolute bare
minimum for any viable self-regulatory plan in the commercial
space context. Thus, as industries like the food and drug industry have done, the space industry must adopt stricter standards
than are legally required.225 It must also start working closely
See HAUFLER, supra note 163, at 9.
Naylor, supra note 164.
223 Jason Rainbow, Bipartisan Legislation Seeks to Reform FCC Satellite Licensing
Rules, SPACENEWS (Feb. 14, 2022), https://spacenews.com/bipartisan-legislationseeks-to-reform-fcc-satellite-licensing-rules/ [https://perma.cc/M3RK-3Y2D].
224 See discussion supra Part I & Section II.B.
225 See discussion supra Section IV.A.
221
222
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with the government and combine resources where possible to
ensure that the myriad factors affecting commercial space exploration are being carried out safely and responsibly among the
dozens of enterprises operating tens of thousands of small satellites. It is not enough for any one player to comply with the legal
standards as they currently stand. Indeed, it is probably not
enough even if all players fully comply with the legal standards
as they currently stand because they are not substantively adequate for large satellite constellations.226 Compliance in this
context is not merely some threshold that needs to be crossed to
access space, nor is it only protective of the general public. It is
vitally necessary for the survival of the industry, and compliance
with the current legal standards alone will not suffice.227
The space industry is obviously unlike other industries in
many respects, but these differences have important practical
and legal ramifications. For instance, the food and drug industry
may have a strong incentive to voluntarily comply with strict selfimposed standards to maintain or improve their goodwill in the
market because compliance correlates directly with profit.228
Where such products are sold to consumers, that kind of goodwill goes a long way. The same motivators are somewhat absent
in the space industry because its product is not disseminated directly to consumers. But there is an even more important motivator: A single bad-faith actor could render all future space
exploration impossible.229 It is in the industry’s best interest to
work in tandem with industry operators and the government as
much as possible to make sure this does not happen.
Indeed, NASA recently called on the FCC to compel SpaceX
to coordinate with NASA “prior to each successive launch” to
ensure SpaceX’s second Starlink generation can be carried out
safely.230 Although it may increase delays and add cost to industry operations, this is not a mere formality—this type of coordination between the government and the industry is exactly the
kind of substantive oversight that could ensure the longevity of
space exploration. Having a single entity like NASA coordinating with all the various private actors could be an extremely effective failsafe.
226
227
228
229
230

See discussion supra Section II.C & Part III.
See discussion supra Section II.B, Part III & Section IV.B.
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
NASA Letter, supra note 213, at 4.
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This leads to the second main takeaway: When private industries work closely with their government counterparts, compliance and efficiency are maximized.231 If NASA started playing
the role of coordinator among private space enterprises by “allow[ing] [commercial space companies] to gradually prove
their concept of operations [to NASA] and troubleshoot any issues that arise along the way,” NASA could start collecting data
that could be used “to develop a longer-term plan for conjunction and interference mitigation at a national and international
level.”232 Having legislation in place that would require this kind
of coordination between the private industry and NASA would
go a long way towards quickly developing robust databases and
providing a single point of regulatory authority with adequate
experience and technical knowledge to which industry questions and concerns could be directed.
Self-regulation is particularly effective when it is (1) adopted
voluntarily and (2) subject to heavy regulatory surveillance.233
The distinction between regulatory surveillance and threat is an
important one. Surveillance includes inspection and oversight,
while threats are correlated with punitive action.234 There is
compelling evidence that heavy regulatory surveillance motivates companies to adhere to regulatory commitments more effectively than regulatory threats (i.e., punitive sanctions).235 Still,
the threat of regulatory sanctions is an important motivator so
long as it remains in the background.236 The threat of international liability under the OST should serve as a large enough
punitive threat without extreme domestic punitive measures to
ensure both adequate regulatory surveillance and private compliance.237 Additionally, the kind of coordination proposed by
NASA would serve as an important surveillance mechanism that
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
NASA Letter, supra note 213.
233 Short & Toffel, supra note 218, at 361.
234 Id. at 370.
235 See id. at 386.
236 See id. at 387.
237 See discussion supra Part III. This assumes, of course, that sanctions would
actually be levied against OST violators. See Jill Stuart, The Outer Space Treaty Has
Been Remarkably Successful – but Is It Fit for the Modern Age?, CONVERSATION (Jan. 27,
2017, 11:59 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-outer-space-treaty-has-beenremarkably-successful-but-is-it-fit-for-the-modern-age-71381 [https://perma.cc/
7ZKD-NV52]. International compliance and liability may become more of a focal
point for federal agencies and operators as a result of the Dish–Viasat litigation
against the FCC. See Kelcee Griffis, DC Circ. Probes Interference Risks of SpaceX’s Starlink, LAW360 (Dec. 3, 2021, 10:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
231
232
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would accomplish a couple of important objectives: (1) it would
allow the government to more adequately perform its regulatory
obligation of overseeing its space operations and lessen its and
the industry’s potential exposure to international liability,238
and (2) it would motivate and compel private actors to comply
more strictly with voluntary and mandatory commitments. Importantly, this would fit neatly into the recently revised regulatory scheme—the industry can present “alternative ways to meet
safety requirements,” backed with NASA’s stamp of approval.239
To provide the resources NASA would need to fulfill this role,
the government should concede on a point that the industry has
demanded: Consolidation of licensing in a single regulatory entity.240 By doing so, the government would effectively have two
main administrative branches for space regulation: a formal licensing branch and a substantive oversight branch. Further, the
substantive branch (NASA) could operate as a liaison to make
sure operators have met the substantive requirements for licensing and effectively give operators the stamp of approval on matters like safety-procedure viability before or during the licensing
process.
Additionally, or perhaps alternatively, licensing processes
could require the approval of some independent review board
similar to the one used by the New Zealand drug industry. The
New Zealand review board is comprised of an adjudicator and
community members that quickly and effectively offer a recommendation.241 Obviously, the space industry and its activities are
more technically complex than the advertising industry and its
activities. However, an independent private review board comprised of experts and stakeholder representatives could be an
effective measure for vetting proposed space activities while protecting stakeholder interests. Ideally, the recommendations
would be based on the stricter, industry-imposed guidelines
mentioned above.242 In theory, compliance could be voluntary,
but if the licensing agencies afforded the recommendations
1445565/dc-circ-probes-interference-risks-of-spacex-s-starlink [https://perma.cc/
P47E-TVKH].
238 See discussion supra Part III.
239 See Foust, supra note 121.
240 See Jeff Foust, Space Industry Seeks Continued Progress on Regulatory Reform,
SPACENEWS (Oct. 30, 2020), https://spacenews.com/space-industry-seeks-continued-progress-on-regulatory-reform/ [https://perma.cc/T5DE-NDQU].
241 See Asher, supra note 175, at 617.
242 See discussion supra Section IV.A.
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great weight in whether an operation receives authorization, this
kind of voluntary compliance could increase overall code
compliance.243
Increasing voluntary collaboration between the industry and
government could also be a cheap and effective measure. There
are some promising collaborative systems currently being implemented that should be emulated across more aspects of commercial space regulation. For instance, NOAA’s OADR is an
ideal—if somewhat late in the game244—collaboration between
the government and the commercial industry to provide a basic
database for space situational awareness free of charge.245 This
kind of open-source project offers a starting point for private
companies to provide more robust situational-awareness services,246 the development of which would naturally impose
greater accountability on individual players by linking their objects to collisions or near collisions.247
These kinds of systems should be emulated across all aspects
of commercial space regulation. NASA has asked that the FCC
require SpaceX to work with NASA “to demonstrate the proposed capability with increasing volumes of satellites prior to
each successive launch so that it may troubleshoot any issues
that arise and make adjustments, as necessary.”248 This is the exact approach that must be taken. Licensing may well be consolidated in a single entity, but regulatory oversight must remain
strong. And cooperation between domestic agencies, the commercial space industry, and international entities must be fluid,
with a mind towards keeping spaceflight safe and sustainable.
Thus, it is not sufficient that the industry remain code compliant in order to be licensed—third parties such as NASA (and,
ideally, international entities)—should be involved in the approval process such that as many entities as possible are not only
apprised of planned commercial space operations but also have
an active hand in coordinating those efforts. Importantly, this is
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
The project is set to be fully operational by 2025. Rao, supra note 134.
SpaceX is aiming to launch fifty satellite payloads in 2022, with approximately
forty to fifty satellites per payload. See Foust, supra note 71. If SpaceX proceeds at
the same rate in 2023, upwards of 5,000 Starlink satellites alone could be
launched before OADR is operational. See id. That is double the number of active
satellites currently in operation. See discussion supra Part I.
245 Foust, supra note 134.
246 See id.
247 See Mann et al., supra note 1.
248 NASA Letter, supra note 213, at 4.
243
244
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not merely another hoop to jump through or an unnecessary
burden on the commercial industry’s access to space, but rather
a condition precedent to the viability of long-term space exploration considering the massive increase of commercial space operations in LEO, which will naturally lead to the complexity of
future activities as LEO becomes more congested.249
Allowing NASA to become more of a coordinator would have
the added benefit of lessening unintended consequences of
commercial space exploration, such as light pollution.250 Having
a neutral third party such as NASA could be an effective tempering device on private companies whose interests may lie more in
capturing market share than the longevity of space exploration.
Indeed, NASA has a history of anticipating the unexpected—it
quarantined Apollo 11 astronauts for three weeks upon their
successful reentry to Earth after the moon landing to ensure
they were not infected by a “moon plague” (an ailment that, it
was ultimately concluded, does not exist).251 Thus, NASA as a
safety coordinator could offer a safety net for the U.S. commercial industry and provide a workable model for other countries
to base their regulatory models on.
Finally, whatever substantive requirements Congress ultimately enacts need a mechanism through which other stakeholders can bring litigation to protect their own interests.
Importantly, this should not take the form of vigilante enforcement whereby anybody can bring suit against space operators
for noncompliance. Rather, this should merely offer a route
through which affected stakeholders can challenge the validity
of a proposed operation to ensure their interests will not be impeded without objection. Ideally, the proposed framework
would operate to lessen the unintended consequences that led
to the Viasat litigation against the FCC and astronomers’ dissatisfaction over their work being affected by light pollution from
satellite constellations. However, because the occurrence of the
unexpected seems to be a given in space exploration, a mechanism that is designed specifically to account for the unexpected
needs to be in place.

See id.
See supra Section II.B.
251 Meghan Bartels, Apollo 11 Astronauts Spent 3 Weeks in Quarantine, Just in Case
of Moon Plague, SPACE.COM (July 24, 2019), https://www.space.com/apollo-11-astronauts-quarantined-after-splashdown.html [https://perma.cc/3GQB-CJ5B].
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CONCLUSION

The commercial space industry is evolving extremely quickly,
and this Comment only scratches the surface of the regulatory
issues that need to be addressed. For instance, some have posited that SpaceX’s use of tens of thousands of satellites may constitute “appropriation of space” under the OST, which would
subject the United States and SpaceX to substantial liability exposure.252 This Comment touches on, but does not fully address,
how the international framework should be modified to adapt
to the burgeoning commercial space industry. Indeed, many of
the issues raised in this Comment can be extrapolated to an international scale. For instance, perfect compliance by one or a
few does little without substantial compliance by all—perfect
compliance by SpaceX does little in the presence of noncompliant orbital objects, and perfect compliance with strict standards by one country does little without similar compliance by
all others.253 Further, perfect compliance by all countries does
little in the presence of a single bad-faith actor. Take, for example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and SpaceX’s use of Starlink to
provide internet to Ukraine.254 What if Russia decides that it
does not want Ukraine to have that internet access and cares
little about international liability should it disrupts that access?
These are all important factors that need to be addressed but
are outside the scope of this Comment.
There are a couple of main points that bear reiterating: (1)
Space regulation is a pressing concern that should not be relegated entirely to the industry and that requires continual government supervision and involvement; (2) the viability of each
proposed satellite mega-constellation must be considered carefully in the context of all other ongoing and future space operations; (3) the government must continuously act to protect the
interests of all stakeholders; and (4) the issues raised herein
need to be addressed on an international level, since international cooperation is just as fundamental as intranational cooperation. This Comment aims to serve as a launching point for a
discourse on how to approach the vitally important regulatory
issues that surround space exploration and its sustainability.
Commercial space is a fragile environment. If that environment
is rushed into without proper care or adequate precaution, the
252
253
254

See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Section II.B & Part IV.
See Kniazhevich, supra note 26.
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science fiction that the industry seeks to make a reality will be
short-lived.

